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Abstract
Previous studies obtained mixed results regarding the association between collectivism
and corruption. To make sense of the mixed results, the current research examined the
moderating role of evaluation apprehension on the relationship between collectivism and
corruption. Study 1, using a bribery scenario, indicated that collectivism facilitated corrup-
tion only when evaluation apprehension was low. Study 2, using a real money bribery
game, confirmed the moderated model found in Study 1. Study 3 further demonstrated the
different effects of vertical/horizontal collectivism on corruption. Our results suggest that a
society may effectively combat corruption by increasing its social costs while, at the same
time, retaining its collectivistic values.
Introduction
Sociologists, economists and psychologists have attempted to establish a connection between
collectivism and corruption [1–3]. While it seems that we should not preserve collectivistic val-
ues to walk the straight and narrow, what is the alternative? We argue that evaluation appre-
hension can aid corruption prevention for collectivism. Evaluation apprehension can influence
attitudes and behaviors in general [4, 5], and impede corruption in particular [6]. Previous
studies on the association between collectivism and corruption paid little attention to evalua-
tion apprehension. Thus, the overall purpose of the current research is to examine the moder-
ating role of evaluation apprehension on the association between collectivism and corruption.
Can Collectivism Promote Corruption?
Collectivism is the extent to which individuals see themselves as an interdependent part of a
larger group or society [2, 7]. There is remarkable consensus that collectivism facilitates cor-
ruption [8–10]. Cross-national analyses also show that collectivism is positively related to bribe
perception [11, 12] and corruption perception [2]. Findings at the individual level of analysis
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further demonstrate a positive association between collectivism and corruption [1–3, 13, 14].
However, there are some exceptions in country-level analysis. The positive impact of collectiv-
ism on corruption is dampened when per capita income or other culture dimension is included
in the model [15, 16]. Furthermore, Bernardi, Delorey [6] found that the acceptability of cor-
ruption increases as a country’s collectivism decreases. The reason for this inconsistent finding
remains unknown.
Evaluation Apprehension, Collectivism and Corruption
Evaluation apprehension has an effect on corruption. Evaluation apprehension is an active,
anxiety-toned concern that one receives a positive evaluation from others, or at least that one
provides no grounds for a negative evaluation [5]. As such, evaluation apprehension can be
manipulated by certain subtle social cues. For instance, the presence of an audience, an imaged
audience [17] or even an eye-like picture could elevate evaluation apprehension [17–21]. Psy-
chologists have long known about the problem of evaluation apprehension in self-report mea-
sures. Behaviors in some domains are more evaluative than others [22]. Corruption is one such
behavior. As there is notable agreement that corruption is a morally repugnant business prac-
tice [2, 23], one may receive a negative evaluation if he/she engages in corrupt behavior. There-
fore, evaluation apprehension can hamper corruption. Consistent with this, Bernardi, Delorey
[6] find a negative effect of evaluation apprehension on corruption.
It is argued that the inconsistent findings regarding the association between collectivism
and corruption may be due to differences in evaluation apprehension. Accumulating evidence
suggests people high in collectivism are more likely to have higher evaluation apprehension
compared to people low in collectivism [24–26]. For example, it has been demonstrated that
evaluation apprehension has effects on service satisfaction when a collectivistic self-construal is
primed, whereas evaluation apprehension exerts little impact on service satisfaction when an
individualistic self-construal is primed [4]. Accordingly, we predict that collectivism is positive-
ly related to corruption when evaluation apprehension is low, but it is negatively related to cor-
ruption when evaluation apprehension is high (Hypothesis 1).
Evaluation Apprehension, Vertical/Horizontal Collectivism and
Corruption
Triandis et al. proposed to include horizontal (valuing equality) and vertical (emphasizing hier-
archy and competition) aspects in the analysis of individualism-collectivism [27, 28]. Thus one
can distinguish two types of collectivism: horizontal collectivism (HC) and vertical collectivism
(VC). People with a horizontal collectivism orientation are especially focused on sociability
and on treating others with benevolence and loyalty. In contrast, people with a vertical collec-
tivism orientation are particularly focused on dutifully fulfilling their obligations to others [28].
The horizontal–vertical dimension adds a nuance to the understanding of the relationship
between collectivism and corruption. Li, Triandis [1] demonstrate that horizontal and vertical
collectivism have different effects on corruption such that vertical collectivism is positively re-
lated to corruption, while horizontal collectivism is not. The evaluation apprehension may ex-
plain these different effects. A primary concern associated with horizontal collectivism is to
save face and maintain good relationships with others [24, 29, 30], thus implying that people
high in horizontal collectivism would be more concerned about evaluation than would people
low in horizontal collectivism. Along similar lines, Lalwani, Shavitt [24] find that horizontal
collectivism significantly and positively predicts evaluation apprehension, while vertical collec-
tivism does not. It is thus reasonable to argue that evaluation apprehension restrains people
high in horizontal collectivism from engaging in corruption, but it does not exert any effect for
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people high in vertical collectivism. Based on the foregoing analysis, we predict that 1) horizon-
tal collectivism is negatively related to corruption when faced with high evaluation apprehen-
sion, but positively related to corruption when faced with low evaluation apprehension
(Hypothesis 2a) and that 2) high vertical collectivism individuals are more likely to engage in
corruption compared to low vertical collectivism individuals, whether evaluation apprehension
is high or low (Hypothesis 2b).
Overview of Studies
The present research examined the possible effect of collectivism on corruption by varying so-
cial contexts in which corruption were elicited. As the most common type of corruption is brib-
ery [15, 16, 31–33], corruption was operationalized as bribery in the present research. Study 1
aimed to test hypothesis 1. In this study, collectivism was measured with a scale, corruption
was measured by the reactions to a bribery scenario, and the manipulation of evaluation appre-
hension was embedded in the same scenario. Study 2 sought to replicate the results of Study 1
by using the same collectivism scale, a different behavioral measurement of corruption (real
money bribery games) and a different subtle cue of social evaluation (an eye-like picture).
Study 3 aimed to test hypotheses 2a and 2b. In this study, horizontal and vertical collectivism
were measured with another scale, corruption was measured by a bribery game, and the manip-
ulation of evaluation apprehension was the same as in Study 2.
Study 1
Methods
Ethics Statement. The study was reviewed and approved by the Committee of Protection
of Subjects at Beijing Normal University. All participants provided written informed consent
before the study, and they were fully debriefed at the end of the research according to the estab-
lished guidelines of the committee. This procedure was followed in Study 2 and Study 3 as well.
Participants. One hundred and sixteen students (100 females and 16 males; mean
age = 20.9 years, SD = 1.62) in introductory courses at two large universities in Beijing partici-
pated in the study. The participants were randomly assigned to the evaluation apprehension
condition (N = 60) or the neutral condition (N = 56) in a between-participants design.
Materials. Collectivism and individualism. The Singelis [34] scale was used to measure
collectivism, α = .75 (12 items; e.g., “It is important for me to maintain harmony within my
group”), and individualism, α = .69 (12 items; e.g., “My personal identity independent of others
is very important to me”). The participants were instructed to indicate the extent to which they
endorsed each statement on a 7-point Likert scale (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).
Bribery scenario. We exposed the participants to a bribery scenario in which they assumed
the role of a sales agent who had competed against two other firms to win a contract from an in-
ternational buyer and earn a commission. The sales agent was contemplating whether to offer an
unofficial payment to the potential international buyer to help win this contract. The bribery sce-
nario was adapted fromMazar and Aggarwal [2]. After reading, the participants were instructed
to complete a 7-point Likert type corruption propensity questionnaire (6 items; e. g., “I think I
will give money to him”; α = .89).
The manipulation of evaluation apprehension. In the neutral condition, the bribery scenario
was exactly the same in Mazar and Aggarwal [2]. In the evaluation apprehension condition, we
added a paragraph revealing the possibility that other people would know what the sales agent
did. To check the effect of the manipulation, the participants were asked, “If I offer unofficial
payments to the buyer, it is likely that other people would know my conduct”. To determine that
our manipulation of evaluation apprehension did not influence the perceived penalty, the
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participants were asked, “If I offer unofficial payments to the buyer, I would be punished for my
conduct”. Responses were again reported on 7-point scales (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly
agree).
Procedure. All the participants completed the questionnaire in sequential order, which in-
cluded the following three parts: a collectivism and individualism measure, a bribery scenario,
and demographic questions including gender, age, and exposure to corruption. The partici-
pants anonymously completed the questionnaires in classrooms.
Results and Discussion
To confirm the effects of evaluation apprehension manipulation, evaluation apprehension
check scores and perceived penalty check scores were analyzed in a one-way (condition: evalu-
ation apprehension vs. neutral) between subjects MANOVA. The main effect of condition on
evaluation apprehension check was significant (Mevaluation apprehension = 5.61,Mneutral = 5.11),
F(1, 113) = 4.20, p< .05, η2 = .04. In contrast, the main effect of condition on perceived penalty
was not significant (Mevaluation apprehension = 4.58,Mneutral = 4.29), F(1, 113) = 0.79, p> .05.
Thus, it can be concluded that the scenario successfully manipulated the participants’ evalua-
tion apprehension, but not the perceived penalty.
To test the moderating effect of evaluation apprehension, general linear model (GLM) anal-
yses were used. Collectivism and individualism scores were mean centered by subtracting their
means from all observations to reduce multicollinearity concerns [35]. Initial analyses were
then conducted with these mean-centered variables, and the cross-product of collectivism/indi-
vidualism with evaluation apprehension provided the interaction term for the model. We
recoded gender and evaluation apprehension using contrast coding (male = −1, female = 1;
neutral condition = −1, evaluation apprehension condition = 1).
Propensity to bribe scores were then submitted to a condition (neutral vs. evaluation appre-
hension) × collectivism multiple regression analysis. The collectivism main effect did not attain
conventional levels of significance (B = 0.03), t(112) = 0.12, p = .90, and the condition main ef-
fect was not significant (B = 0.06), t(112) = 0.39, p = .69. The predicted
condition × collectivism effect was significant (B = −.62), t(112) = −2.96, p< .01, ΔR2 = 0.075.
We further examined this interaction using simple slope analyses [35]. Fig 1 shows the slope of
Fig 1. Evaluation apprehension moderates the relationship between collectivism and corruption.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123859.g001
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collectivism in the neutral condition and in the evaluation apprehension condition. Our results
suggest that when the possibility of being evaluated is low, people with high collectivism are
more likely to engage in corruption (B = 0.64), t(112) = 2.01, p< .05; in contrast, when the pos-
sibility of being evaluated is high, people with high collectivism are less likely to engage in cor-
ruption (B = −0.59), t(112) = −2.21, p< .05. The same analyses were conducted again after
including the demographic variables of age, gender and exposure to corruption in separate
analyses of covariance, but these did not affect the results. Age (B = 0.20, t(109) = 2.20, p< .05)
and exposure (B = 0.21, t(109) = 2.41, p< .05) were significant predictors, while gender was far
from significant (B = -0.01, t(109) = -.01, p = .99). Thus, controlling for a variety of demo-
graphic factors, the relations between evaluation apprehension, collectivism and corruption re-
mained unchanged. Thus, the results confirm hypothesis 1.
The study suggested that evaluation apprehension moderated the link between collectivism
and corruption. Our findings help explain results of previous studies that found mixed and
conflicting results regarding the relationship between collectivism and corruption [1–3, 6, 8,
13, 15].
Propensity to bribe scores were then submitted to a condition (neutral vs. evaluation apprehen-
sion) × individualism multiple regression analysis. Neither the condition main effect (B = 0.02),
t(112) = 0.13, p = .90, nor the individualism main effect (B = .277), t(112) = 1.3, p = .19, nor the
condition × individualism interaction (B = .052), t(112) = 0.30, p = .76 attained conventional levels
of significance.
Thus we did not find that evaluation apprehension moderates the relationship between indi-
vidualism and corruption. It is understandable that we did not get the effects for the individual-
ism scale as the collectivism and individualism scales from the Singelis’s measure are
orthogonal [36]. This result is consistent with previous results that collectivism is associated
with social evaluation concerns, while individualism is not [24–26]. Accordingly, individualism
is not considered in Study 2 and Study 3.
Study 2
The objective of Study 2 was twofold. Firstly, we sought to ascertain the generalizability of the
moderated model found in Study 1 with a different manipulation of evaluation apprehension.
In Study 1, evaluation apprehension was manipulated by a scenario. In Study 2, we used an
eye-like picture to induce evaluation apprehension. This procedure hides the purpose of the
manipulation from participants. Secondly, we sought to further improve the ecological validity
of the moderated model using a real money game. In Study 1, corruption was measured by
self-report. However, psychologists have long questioned the validity of self-report measures of
social behavior [37]. To overcome this methodological limitation, the experiment includes a
bribery game with behavioral outcomes for Study 2. In this bribery game, participants could
bribe his/her “counterpart” with real money in order to earn a higher payoff.
Methods
Participants. Forty eight participants (26 females and 22 males; mean age = 22.3 years,
SD = 2.24) participated in the study. Participants received￥0 to￥56 (depending on each par-
ticipant’s performance in the bribery game) as an incentive for their participation. Half of the
participants were randomly allocated to the evaluation apprehension condition, and the other
half were assigned to the neutral condition.
Materials. Collectivism. The same 12-item scale [34] as in Study 1 was used to measure
collectivism, α = .69.
Evaluation Apprehension, Collectivism and Corruption
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Bribery game. A real money bribery game adopted from Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt [38]
was used to measure corruption. We adapted the bribery game in two ways so that we could af-
ford it. First, we divided all the amount by 1000, using￥1 instead of￥1000. Second, the game
was played only once. There were two roles in the game: a firm and a public official. As a poten-
tial briber, the firm wished to run an industrial plant that would cause negative consequences
to the public. The public official must decide whether to give the firm a permission to operate.
The firm, however, could make a private payment to the official in the hopes of influencing the
official’s decision. Although we made participants realize that they would be randomly desig-
nated as either the firm or the public official, we actually assigned all of the participants to the
role of firm. Participants were told that the game was for real money. They made the actual
choice between offering and not offering a bribe. If one decided to offer a bribe, one must speci-
fy the amount to be sent, which could be an integer of the range from RMB￥1 to￥9. They
were also told that the use of the ID numbers throughout the experiment would ensure their
anonymity.
Manipulation of evaluation apprehension. An eye-like picture (the eyes of Horus) adopted
from Haley and Fessler [20] was used to prime evaluation apprehension (Fig 2). A flower
image adopted from Bateson, Nettle [18] was used for the neutral condition. To check the effect
of the manipulation, a 3-item scale adopted from Govern and Marsch [39] were used, α = .64
(e.g., “I am concerned about the way I present myself”).
The eyes of Horus were used to prime evaluation apprehension in Study 2 and 3.
Procedure. After accessing the collectivism scale via pencil and paper, participants com-
pleted the bribery game, manipulation check, demographic questions and suspicion check via a
computer terminal. The eye-like picture or the flower image was displayed at the top of the
computer screen until the start of the suspicion check.
Results and Discussion
The suspicion check showed that no participant correctly guessed the purpose of the study. As
expected, participants reported greater evaluation apprehension in the evaluation condition
(M = 4.66, SD = 1.14) than in the neutral condition (M = 3.81, SD = 1.31), F(1, 46) = 5.81,
p< .05, η2 = .11. Analyses were conducted with mean-centered variable, and the cross-product
of collectivism with evaluation apprehension provided the interaction term for the model. We
recoded gender and evaluation apprehension using contrast coding (male = −1, female = 1;
neutral condition = −1, evaluation apprehension condition = 1).
When predicting the dichotomous scoring of bribery, we used a logistic regression analysis.
The predictors in this analysis included two sets of variables (main-effect terms and interaction
terms) entered in a hierarchical fashion. Neither the main-effect of collectivism (B = -0.48, χ2 (1,
N = 48) = 0.17, p = .62) nor evaluation apprehension (B = 0.08, χ2 (1, N = 48) = 0.05, p = .82)
were significant. The evaluation apprehension × collectivism was significantly related to offering
a bribe, B = -3.59, χ2 (1, N = 48) = 9.71, p< .05. This pattern held with the control variables,
Fig 2. The eye-like picture.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123859.g002
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including age, gender and exposure to corruption. In addition, age is the only covariates that was
marginally significantly related to offering bribery, B = .34, χ2 (1, N = 48) = 2.86, p = .09.
To further test the moderating effect of evaluation apprehension, we used a linear regression
framework, regressing the bribe size on collectivism, evaluation apprehension and the interac-
tion between them. The collectivism main effect did not attain conventional levels of signifi-
cance (B = 0.05), t(44) = 0.08, p = .94. The condition main effect was not significant (B = 0.33),
t(44) = 1.08, p = .28. The predicted condition × collectivism effect was significant (B = -2.57), t
(44) = -3.91, p< .001, ΔR2 = 0.252. Simple slope analyses show that in the neutral condition,
participants with high collectivism offered more money (B = 2.62), t(44) = 2.66, p< .05; in con-
trast, in the evaluation apprehension condition, participants with high collectivism offered less
money (B = -2.52), t(44) = -2.89, p< .01. Finally, the results were the same with the control
variables. Age is the only control covariate that was marginally significantly related to briber
size, B = .39, t(41) = 1.68, p = .07.
These results support the moderated model found in study 1. Collectivism could facilitate
corruption under low evaluation apprehension, but impede corruption under high evaluation
apprehension. We demonstrated the replicability of the results of study 1. Study 2 also ad-
dresses two weaknesses of Study 1. First, rather than relying on participants to admit to corrup-
tion, study 2 uses a game in order to allow participants engage in actual bribery behavior with
real money. Second, study 2 uses a subtle social cue to prime evaluation apprehension. We
found that even a subtle social cue could evoke evaluation apprehension and exert an influence
on corruption.
Study 3
Study 3 aimed to test hypotheses 2a (evaluation apprehension could moderate the association
between horizontal collectivism and corruption) and hypotheses 2b (the moderator does not
apply to the association between vertical collectivism and corruption). It was designed to an-
swer the following two questions: Do horizontal and vertical collectivism associate to corrup-
tion differently? What is the role of evaluation apprehension plays on these associations?
Methods
Participants. Sixty two participants (42 females and 20 males; mean age = 21.2 years,
SD = 2.60) participated in the study. They were recruited through a poster displayed at an In-
ternet forum of a university. Participants received forum credits (depending on each partici-
pant’s performance in the bribery game) as an incentive for their participation. Half of the
participants were randomly allocated to the evaluation apprehension condition, and the other
half were assigned to the neutral condition.
Materials. Horizontal/Vertical collectivism. An 8-item scale adopted from Triandis and
Gelfand [28] was used to measure horizontal and vertical collectivism. For example, “If a co-
worker gets a prize, I would feel proud” (horizontal collectivism), and “Parents and children
must stay together as much as possible” (vertical collectivism). The participants were instructed
to indicate the extent to which they endorsed each statement on a 7-point Likert scale
(1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree). The subscale reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) were as
follows: horizontal collectivism, α = .81; vertical collectivism, α = .64.
Bribery game. A four-shot bribery game adopted from Abbink and Hennig-Schmidt [38]
was used to measure corruption. The game began with an instruction [38] that made the par-
ticipants realize that their payment for participating in the study would be dependent on their
performance in the game. There were 4-round games between different players. Thus, the
short-term relationships between a briber and a public official were modeled. In each round,
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participants made the actual choice between offering and not offering a bribe. If one decided to
offer a bribe, one must specify the amount to be sent, which could be an integer of the range
from RMB￥1000 to 9000. The subjects were paid anonymously, at an exchange rate of 0.05
forum credits per Yuan. They were also told that the use of the ID numbers throughout the ex-
periment would ensure their anonymity.
Manipulation of evaluation apprehension. The same eye-like picture and flower image as in
Study 2 was used to prime evaluation apprehension. We used the same manipulation check
[39] as in Study 2, α = .77 (e.g., “I am concerned about the way I present myself”).
Procedure. All data were collected using Qualtrics Research Suite. The participants com-
pleted the horizontal and vertical collectivism measures, bribery game, manipulation check, de-
mographic questions and suspicion check in sequential order online. After the collectivism
measure, the eye-like picture or the flower image was displayed at the top of the computer
screen until the start of the suspicion check.
Results and Discussion
The suspicion check showed that no participant correctly guessed the purpose of the study.
Participants in the evaluation apprehension condition reported higher evaluation apprehen-
sion (M = 4.17, SD = 1.74) than did participants in the neutral condition (M = 3.34, SD = 1.22),
F(1, 60) = 4.71, p< .05, η2 = .07, thus suggesting that our manipulation was effective.
To examine the effects of the horizontal collectivism, vertical collectivism evaluation appre-
hension and any interactions on payments of bribes and sizes of bribes, HLM analyses were
conducted. All metric variables were centered such that the intercepts represented the effect for
an average person. Table 1 shows the results.
Models 1 and 2 show that vertical collectivism significantly predicted corruption, but hori-
zontal collectivism did not. Further, and as expected, horizontal collectivism × evaluation ap-
prehension interaction was significant, but vertical collectivism × evaluation apprehension
Table 1. Predicting Corruption with Horizontal Collectivism, Vertical Collectivism, and Evaluation Apprehension.
HLM level Model 1 Model 2
Bribe payment Bribe size Bribe payment Bribe size
Gender -.58 -.15 -.42 -.03
Age .00 .17 -.05 .12
Exposure -.40* -.67*** -.25 -.52*
HC -.09 -.01
VC -.63* .65*
EA -.25 -.42† -.28 -.49†
HC × EA -.71* -1.16**
VC × EA -.22 -.26
Time -.05 -.12 -.05 -.12
For time effects, approximate df s = 240. For all other effects, approximate dfs = 55. VC = vertical collectivism; HC = horizontal collectivism;
EA = evaluation apprehension. Bribe payment was recoded using dummy coding (Not bribe = 0, bribe = 1). Bribe size was divided by 1000. Time was
recoded as follows: first time as “1”, second time as “2”, and so on. Gender and evaluation apprehension were recorded using contrast coding (male = −1,
female = 1; neutral condition = −1, evaluation apprehension condition = 1).
†p < .08.
*p < .05.
**p < 0.01.
***p < 0.001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0123859.t001
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interaction was not. To probe horizontal collectivism × evaluation apprehension interactions,
the simple slopes for neutral condition and evaluation apprehension condition were computed
[40]. Horizontal collectivism was positively related to corruption in the neutral condition
(bribe payment B = .88, t(55) = 1.87, p = .06; bribe size B = 1.15, t(55) = 2.60, p< .01), but nega-
tively related to corruption in the evaluation apprehension condition (bribe payment B = -1.19,
t(55) = -1.77, p< .08; bribe size B = -1.16, t(55) = -2.36, p< .05).
These results support Hypotheses 2a and 2b. Specifically, people high in horizontal collec-
tivism would bribe only in a low evaluation apprehension condition. However, people high in
vertical collectivism would bribe in both high and low evaluation apprehension conditions.
These results were consistent regardless of how corruption was operationalized (as bribe pay-
ment or bribe size).
General discussion
Collectivism and Corruption
In sum, we found that collectivism predicted corruption differently depending on evaluation
apprehension. We observed a positive association between collectivism and corruption in the
neutral condition, and a negative association between collectivism and corruption in the evalu-
ation apprehension condition. We found evidence for this moderated model in Study 1 and 2
in which different measures of bribery and different manipulation of evaluation apprehension
were used. These findings help explain when collectivism increases corruption, demonstrating
that evaluation apprehension is a crucial influence on this relationship.
Our results indicate that evaluation apprehension helps to understand the mixed results of
the relationship between collectivism and corruption. Several researchers argue that collectiv-
ism facilitates corruption [1–3, 9, 13]. However, some studies show that there is little associa-
tion between collectivism and corruption [15, 16]. Furthermore, Bernardi, Delorey [6]
originally included evaluation apprehension as a part of their research design and found a sur-
prising negative relationship between collectivism and corruption. To make sense of these
mixed results, the current research reveals that evaluation apprehension serves as a boundary
condition for the positive association between the two.
However, it is unclear whether evaluation apprehension is high or low in most previous
studies exploring the relationship between collectivism and corruption. For instance, Wated
and Sanchez [14] electronically mailed or faxed the survey to all enterprises in the sampling
frame requesting their participation in the study. Further, most previous researchers did not re-
port the social contexts in which participants completed the measures [1, 2, 13, 41]. According
to our results, subtle social cues can evoke evaluation apprehension that moderate relationship
between collectivism and corruption. It is hard to make sense of the relationship between col-
lectivism and corruption without consideration of its social context. Future researchers in the
field should be cautious about the social cues related to evaluation apprehension in their
studies.
It is argued that evaluation apprehension is a variate rather than a covariate. Bernardi,
Delorey [6] note that evaluation apprehension should be controlled for in corruption research.
However, our results support the notion that evaluation apprehension is a key variable in cor-
rupt research, but not a noise. The difference in evaluation apprehension reflects the different
ways people high and low in collectivism pursue their goals. Ignoring the variance of evaluation
apprehension or excluding it with statistical control may generate results with little significance
of collectivism. The results also support the idea that people high in collectivism are concerned
about external evaluation [24–26, 42]. Thus, the importance of the interplay of collectivism
and evaluation apprehension must be taken into consideration in the field.
Evaluation Apprehension, Collectivism and Corruption
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Different Effects of Vertical and Horizontal Collectivism on Corruption
Study 3 further demonstrated the different effects of vertical/horizontal collectivism on corrup-
tion. In Study 3, we found that the relationship between horizontal collectivism and corruption
is moderated by evaluation apprehension, but the moderator does not apply to the association
between vertical collectivism and corruption, albeit vertical collectivism alone is associated
with corruption. The results further advance the findings by Li, Triandis [1] in which vertical
collectivism positively predicts corruption, whereas horizontal collectivism does not predict it.
The subtle relationships between horizontal collectivism, vertical collectivism, corruption and
evaluation apprehension suggest that evaluation apprehension explains the different effects of
horizontal and vertical collectivism on corruption.
In addition, our findings add to a growing literature suggesting that the horizontal and verti-
cal distinction enriches our understanding of collectivism. Singelis, Triandis [27] suggest that
vertical collectivism is the essential element of collectivism. However, as Lalwani, Shavitt [24]
and our results show that it is horizontal collectivism that is similar to collectivism, it is impera-
tive to further investigate the conceptual relations between horizontal collectivism, vertical col-
lectivism and collectivism.
Practical Implications
Many corrective policies assume that all it takes to curb corruption is to increase its economic
costs, for example, increasing the penalty [2]. However, the current research draws attention to
the social costs of corruption and demonstrates that some social cues related to evaluation ap-
prehension may be enough to reduce corruption for collectivism in general, and for horizontal
collectivism for particular. Moreover, Study 1 demonstrates that evaluation apprehension has
nothing to do with economic penalties.
Social scientists often lay the blame on collectivism when they attempt to determine the rea-
son why certain nations have a greater propensity to engage in corruption [1–3]. However, to
reduce corruption, “traditional” societies with higher corruption may not need to emulate the
societies that have well-grounded “modern” values [43].Several Pacific communities have
adopted new institutions to lower corruption while, at the same time, retaining their traditional
institutions and values [44]. For example, Samoa formalizes traditional leadership in various
kinds of national councils of chiefs. The reports did not find evidence of corruption among
these organizations [45]. Our results suggest that a society may effectively combat corruption
by increasing its social costs while, at the same time, retaining its collectivistic values.
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